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SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF 
BROKEN PLEA BARGAINS IN 
CALIFORNIA: PEOPLE v. 
CALLOWAY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the California Supreme Court approved the practice 
of plea bargaining in People v. West,1 the courts have struggled 
with determining the proper remedy for a broken plea bargain. 
The most common remedy is to allow the defendant to withdraw 
his plea.2 Where a defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange 
for an agreed upon disposition of the case, plea withdrawal ade-
quately remedies a resulting broken agreement by returning the 
defendant to the pre-plea bargained position. 
In certain cases, however, specific enforcement of the plea 
bargain may be allowed as an alternative remedy and is most 
likely to be available when the agreement is broken by either the 
prosecutor or the defendant. When the judge breaks the agree-
ment, California courts are reluctant to order specific enforce-
ment-possibly due to the legislative barriers of Califonia Penal 
Code section 1192.5.8 Notwithstanding section 1192.5, specific 
enforcement seems the only adequate remedy in situations 
where a defendant, in reliance on the agreement, is placed in 
such a position that a return to the pre-plea bargained status 
quo is impossible. This was the position in which the defendant 
found himself in People v. Calloway.· 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
In 1957 the California legislature enacted Penal Code sec-
1. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970). 
2. E.g., People v. Kaanehe, 19 Cal. 3d 1, 559 P.2d 1028, 136 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1977); 
People v. Pinon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 120, 125, 110 Cal. Rptr. 406, 409 (1973). 
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1970). 
4. 29 Cal. 3d 666, 631 P.2d 30, 175 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1981). 
487 
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tion 1192.3& which provided a limited form of plea bargaining. 
Pursuant to that section, a defendant who pled guilty could 
specify the punishment to the same extent it could be specified 
by a jury. If both the prosecutor and court accepted that specifi-
cation, the punishment could not exceed that designated. The 
subsequent case law requiring that a guilty plea be voluntarily 
and intelligently waived on the record may have accounted for 
that section's later repeal. 
For example, in 1969, the Supreme Court decided Boykin v. 
Alabama· which held that a trial record must affirmatively show 
that a defendant who pleaded guilty did so voluntarily and intel-
ligently and that he waived the three principal constitutional 
rights surrendered by such a plea: the right to trial by jury, the 
right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-
incrimination." Later that year, the California Supreme Court 
decided In re Tahl8 which explicated the procedures necessi-
tated by Boykin. Boykin and Tahl only involved simple guilty 
pleas, but since plea bargains may involve either a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere, the same constitutional rights are waived 
and the same requirements apply in either case. 
In 1970 the California legislature replaced Penal Code sec-
tion 1192.3 with section 1192.5.· That section allows the defen-
dant to state the maximum punishment or suspension of sen-
tence. If either the judge or the prosecutor disapproves the 
sentencing recommendation, the plea is automatically with-
drawn. If the court approves the plea, it must inform the defen-
dant that its approval is not binding and may, at the time set for 
the hearing or the application for probation or pronouncement 
of judgment, withdraw its approval in light of further considera-
tion. Such withdrawal empowers the defendant to withdraw his 
plea. Tpe court must also question the defendant to satisfy itself 
that the plea· is freely and voluntarily made and that there is a 
factual basis for such a plea. 
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.3 (repealed 1970). 
6. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
7. Id. at 243-44. 
8. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 132, 460 P.2d 449, 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. 677, 584 (1969). 
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1970). 
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In People v. West,10 the California Supreme Court approved 
a plea bargain in which the defendant pleaded guilty to an of-
fense which offered the trial judge the option for sentencing him 
as a misdemeanant. This benefit as not then available for the 
crime initially charged, since the lesser offense was not necessa-
rily included within the crime initially charged but only reasona-
bly related to it. Based on this act of leniency, the defendant 
tried to renege on the plea agreement.11 The trial court refused 
to allow him to do so. 
The Supreme Court noted that, although Penal Code sec-
tion 1192.5 did not encompass the form of the plea bargain pre-
sent in West (pleading to a non-included lesser offense), it 
demonstrated "the growing legislative recognition and approval 
of plea bargaining."ll1 The court perceived section 1192.5 as pro-
viding "guidelines which the trial court can utilize in receiving 
and considering plea bargains involving pleas to lesser 
offenses. "18 
In some cases, the courts apparently perceive section 1192.5 
as providing guidelines in considering the proper remedy when a 
plea agreement is rejected.14 Because plea withdrawal is the only 
remedy mentioned in Penal Code section 1192.5, courts may be 
reluctant to allow specific enforcement as an alternative remedy. 
B. DEVELOPMENT IN THE COURTS 
The Supreme Court decision in Santobello v. New York1& is 
important because it attests to the Court's view that specific en-
forcement is an option to be considered when determining the 
proper remedy for a broken plea bargain. The Court also stated 
that plea bargaining "is an essential component of the adminis-
tration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. 
If any criminal case were subjected to a full-scale trial, the states 
and federal government would need to multiply by many times 
10. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970). 
11. See the vacated opinion of the Court of Appeal at 83 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1970). 
12. 3 Cal. 3d at 608, 477 P.2d at 416, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393. 
13. ld. 
14. See People v. Calloway, 29 Cal. 3d 666, 631 P.2d 30, 175 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1981); 
People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604, 112 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974). 
15. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
3
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the number of judges and court facilities."l' 
Santobello was indicted in New York on two gambling 
charges and agreed to plead guilty to a lesser included offense in 
exchange for the prosecutor's promise to make no sentencing 
recommendation. After prolonged delays, the matter came up 
for the probation and sentence hearing, at which a new prosecu-
tor, apparently unaware of the prior agreement, recommended 
the maximum sentence. Claiming that the recommendation had 
no effect on his decision, the judge imposed the maximum 
sentence.17 
Mter recognizing that defendants have a constitutional 
right to relief for broken plea agreements,ll the then seven-
member Courtl' reversed and remanded to the New York state 
courts to determine whether specific performance of the state's 
promise with resentencing before a different judge, or recission 
of the plea was the appropriate remedy.to The Court sharply di-
vided in determining to what extent the defendant's preference 
should be considered by the Court in affording him an appropri-
ate remedy.11 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas was of the view 
that due process requires specific enforcement or the option to 
go to trial whenever the prosecutor breaks a plea bargain. tt He 
observed that the lower court "ought to accord- a defendant's 
preference considerable, if not controlling weight, inasmuch as 
the fundamental rights flouted by a prosecutor's breach of a plea 
bargain are those of the defendant, not of the state. "ta 
16. 1d. at 260. 
17.1d. 
18. Jd. at 262. 
19. Justices Black and Harlan retired prior to the filing of the decision on December 
20, 1971. Justices Powell and Rehnquist were not sworn in until January 7, 1972. 
20. 404 U.S. at 263. 
21. While Justices Burger, White and Blackmun were 8ilent on what weight to give 
to the defendant's preference 88 to remedy, Justice Dougl88, concurring, urged that the 
defendant'8 preference should be given much weight while Justice Marshall, joined by 
Justices Brennan and Stewart, diBBenting, believed that since the defendant here W88 
reasonably requesting plea withdrawal, he should be given his chosen remedy. See dis-
CUB8ion accompanying notes 22-25. infra. 
22. 404 U.S. at 267. 
23.ld. 
4
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Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, 
dissented in part, arguing that Santo bello's choice of plea with-
drawal should be honored because the prosecutor's breach of the 
bargain "undercuts the basis for the waiver of the constitutional 
rights implicit in the plea" and furnishes defendant with "ample 
justification for rescinding the plea."u Noting that of the seven 
members sitting at the time of the decision a majority favored 
looking to defendant's wishes,2& Justice Marshall concluded that 
the defendant should be allowed to regain his right to trial if 
that is what he desires. 
While Santobello was a case in which the prosecutor re-
neged, Justices Marshall and Douglas expressed similar views in 
a case where the judge "injected himself into the process."IS 
Past California cases have acknowledged the availability of 
specific enforcement to a criminal defendant, when a judge had 
breached the plea bargained agreement.:n In People v. Delles,1I 
decided prior to the enactment of section 1192.5, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of marijuana in return 
for a grant of probation upon condition that he serve some time 
in county jail. The defendant was granted probation and was 
given a short stay before commencing the jail term.1I The judge 
was unaware that the defendant had been arrested for selling 
narcotics after the bargain was struck. On the day defendant ap-
peared to commence his sentence, the judge stated that he had 
learned of the new charge, denied defendant's motion for plea 
withdrawal and sentenced him to state prison. so 
The California Supreme Court held it was improper to hold 
defendant to his guilty plea while denying him the bargained 
grant of probation, and therefore the trial court was obligated 
either to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or to grant 
24. [d. at 268. 
25. [d. 
26. Martinez v. Mancusi, 409 U.S. 959 (1972) (Marshall and Douglas, J.J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). For the court of appeals decision, see United States ex rei. 
Mancusi v. Martinez, 455 F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1972). 
27. See text accompanying notes 28·38, infra. 
28. 69 Cal. 2d 906, 447 P.2d 629, 73 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1968). 
29. [d. at 908, 447 P.2d at 630, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 390. 
30. [d. 
5
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probation despite the new circumstances. 11 
Cases heard subsequent to the enactment of section 1192.5 
have also mentioned the availability of specific enforcement of a 
bargained agreement. In People v. Flores's defendant pleaded 
guilty to one court of first degree robbery in exchange for a dis-
missal of fourteen remaining counts. When the judge asked the 
defendant if he knew the maximum setence that could be im-
posed, the defendant replied, "five to life."" At sentencing, the 
judgment included a recital that defendant had used a firearm 
during the robbery which invoked a California statuteM adding a 
mandatory consecutive term of five years to his minimum sen-
tence. In setting aside the additional five year term, a unani-
mous court stated: 
[W]here a defendant's guilty plea has been en-
tered as part of a bargain with recognized author-
ities, and judgment entered contrary to the terms 
of the bargain, he may move to have his plea set 
aside, or the judgment may be modified to con-
form with the terms of his bargain. III 
Although the court never mentioned the term "specific perform-
ance," it noted that defendant was allowed the "benefit of his 
plea bargain."" 
In People v. Ramos," defendant pleaded guilty to one of 
seven counts in exchange for promises to dismiss the remaining 
counts, strike five prior convictions, grant probation, and sen-
tence him to no additional time. The court approved the plea 
bargain, granted probation, then sentenced defendant to prison 
for violating probation on three of the five prior cases. Defen-
dant sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that he understood 
the plea bargain covered all cases. In reversing the conviction, 
the California Supreme Court held that the trial judge had the 
option of allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea or to grant pro-
bation not subject to immediate revocation of probation in the 
31. Id. at 910, 447 P.2d at 632, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 392. 
32. 6 Cal. 3d 305, 491 P.2d 406, 98 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1971). 
33. Id. at 309, 491 P.2d at 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 824. 
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5 (West 1970). 
35. 6 Cal. 3d at 308-09, 491 P.2d at 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 824. 
36. Id. at 309, 491 P.2d at 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 824. 
37. 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1972). 
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other cases.38 
The significance of these cases is that the court recognized 
the availability of specific enforcement of a plea bargain as an 
alternative to withdrawal of the guilty plea. While both the Del-
les and Ramos courts left the ultimate decision on the remedy 
with the trial court, the Flores court ordered the trial court to 
give the defendant the benefit of the bargain. 
More recent cases appear to deny the availability of specific 
enforcement as an alternative remedy for plea withdrawal. In 
People v. Johnson," defendant pleaded guilty to credit card for-
gery in return for a misdemeanor sentence, suspension of sen-
tence and a. grant of probation. Upon later discovering that de-
fendant had concealed his true name and past criminal record, 
the court sentenced him to state prison, contrary to the plea 
bargain. Because the court failed to advise Johnson of his right 
under section 1192.5 to withdraw his plea, the California Su-
preme Court reversed.40 
Johnson argued the court's failure to inform him of his right 
to withdraw should allow him to opt for specific enforcement as 
an alternative,41 but the court found that "implicit in the lan-
guage of section 1192.5 is the premise that the court upon sen-
tencing has broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a 
negotiated plea."41 The court also said it was the "serious mis-
representations by the defendant which reinforced the court's 
reluctance to create a right of specific performance of a plea bar-
gain whenever the court has failed to advise a defendant of his 
rights under Section 1192.5."48 
While the court was concerned with the misrepresentation 
made during plea negotiations, its remedy for the trial court's 
failure to advise Johnson of his right to withdraw his plea ap-
pears to have been dictated by section 1192.5 which makes no 
38. Id. at 112, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 505. 
39. 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604, 112 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974). 
40. [d. at 873, 519 P.2d at 607, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 559. 
41. Id. The main issue in Johnson, however, was whether defendant had a right to 
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reference to specific enforcement as an option to the defendant. 
Arguably, Johnson can best be understood as standing for the 
proposition that a criminal defendant will never be allowed spe-
cific enforcement of his plea bargain when the defendant's de-
ception leads to a plea bargain which he would not receive if the 
true facts were known. 
While Delles, Flores, Ramos and Johnson were cases in 
which the defendants sought specific enforcement of the plea 
agreement, in People v. Kaanehe,44 the prosecution sought spe-
cific enforcement4& while the defendant sought to withdraw his 
plea. Although this case involved a breach by the prosecutor, not 
the judge, it is significant because the California Supreme Court 
gave the defendant the option of withdrawing his plea or ob-
taining specific. enforcement.48 
In Kaanehe, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
grand theft in exchange for the prosecutor's promise to refrain 
from arguing disposition or type of sentence to the court. While 
the defendant was held in the Department of Corrections for a 
diagnostic study, the prosecutor's office sent a letter to the su-
perintendent of the facilities in which defendant was detained, 
arguing, in effect, that defendant should be sent to state prison. 
Prior to the formal sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued in 
the judge's chambers for imposition of a prison sentence." When 
formally arraigned for sentencing, the defendant moved to with-
draw his plea, claiming the prosecutor breached the bargain. Al-
though both the diagnostic study and the probation officer rec-
ommended a suspended sentence along with time in the county 
jail, the judge sentenced the defendant to state prison. 
While recognizing that the proper "remedy differs depend-
ing upon the nature of the breach and which party is seeking 
specific enforcement,"48 the court noted that "a defendant 
should not be entitled to enforce an agreement between himself 
44. 19 Cal. 3d I, 559 P.2d 1028, 136 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1977). 
45. [d. at 13, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417. The prosecution argued that 
the defendant should be arraigned for sentencing, the prosecutor's letter stricken from 
the record and the prosecutor be ordered to comply with the terms of the agreement. 
46. [d. at 13, 559 P.2d at 1037, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 418. 
47. [d. at 11, 559 P.2d at 1035, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 416. 
48. [d. at 13, 559 P.2d at 1037, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 418. 
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and the prosecutor calling for a particular disposition against 
the trial court absent very special circumstances."49 The court 
stated that "specific enforcement . . . must be strictly limited 
because it is not intended that a defendant and prosecutor 
should be able to bind a trial court which is required to weigh 
the pre-sentence report and exercise its customary sentencing 
discretion,"lo and, consequently, the preferred remedy is to al-
low plea withdrawal to restore the proceedings to the status 
quo. II 
Although specific enforcement did not bind the trial judge 
here, the court found specific enforcement would not repair the 
harm caused by the prosecutor's breach because it would be in-
appropriate to require defendant to undergo another diagnostic 
study not tainted by the prosecutor's letter. II Another factor was 
the deliberate and wilful nature of the breach. IS 
It appears that in determining the proper remedy for a plea 
bargained agreement breached by the judge, the overriding con-
cerns of the court are two-fold: (1) The deference to the trial 
court's discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a plea bar-
gained agreement upon weighing the presentencing reports;14 
and (2) the probability of returning the defendant to his pre-
plea bargained position. II While these seem to be the logical ele-
ments with which the court would concern itself, the Calloway 
decision diminishes, if not destroys, the importance of this latter 
concern. 
III. PEOPLE v. CALLOWAY 
A. FACTS 
Calloway entered into a plea bargain, approved by the 
judge, in which he admitted violating the terms of his probation 
(based on a battery conviction) and accepted a 90-day prison 
49.Id. 
50. Id. at 14, 559 P.2d at 1036·37, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417·18. 
51. [d. at 13·14, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417. 
52. Id. Although the diagnostic evaluation did not recommend state prison, it was 
entirely possible that the study would have made an even more lenient recommendation 
had it not been influenced by the prosecutor's letter. 
53. Id. at 14, 559 P.2d at 1037, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 418. 
54. See People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d at 873, 519 P.2d at 607, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 559. 
55. See People v. Kaanehe, 19 Cal. 3d at 14, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 418. 
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commitment for a diagnostic study pursuant to California Penal 
Code section 1203.03.1141 In return, the judge promised to make no 
finding concerning the other allegations of probation violationll7 
and not to sentence him to state prison.1I8 After reading the sec-
tion 1203.03 report recommending revocation of probation, the 
judge sentenced Calloway to two years in state prison. Neither 
the deputy district attorney nor the deputy public defender at-
tending the sentencing proceedings had been present when the 
original bargain was struck. Consequently, neither party re-
minded the judge of the bargain. 
A week later, Calloway wrote a letter to the judge reminding 
him of the plea bargain. The letter was treated as an ex parte 
request for rehearing and denied. Six months later Calloway was 
released on bail pending appeal. lie 
B. MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS 
Because Calloway did not receive an opportunity to with-
draw his plea after the judge had reneged on the bargain, both 
the prosecution and the defense counsel agreed that the judg-
ment could not stand. Consequently, the court had to decide the 
appropriate remedy for Calloway's breached plea bargain. The 
majority, in a 4-3 decision,eo limited defendant's remedy to plea 
56. CAL. PENAL CODI! § 1203.03 (West 1970) provides, in relevant part: "(a) In any 
case in which a defendant is convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison, the court ... may order that defendant be placed temporarily with a diag-
nostic facility of the Department of Corrections for a period not to exceed 90 days 
" 
57. Those violations were the failure to obey instructions of probations officers, de-
sertion from probation, and failure to report to probation officers. 29 Cal. 3d at 669, 631 
P.2d at 31, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 597. 
58. The language of the judge is helpful in understanding the bargain: 
My agreement on the record between the diatrict attorney 
and your attorney is that 1 will not sentence you to the state 
prison when you return [from the section 1203.03 study). I 
will either sentence you to the county jail, put you back on 
probation, perhaps terminate probation completely in this 
case, allow you to have probation on your municipal court case 
... , change the conditions of probation. 1 am really not tell-
ing you what 1 am going to do, but 1 am making a commit-
ment that you will not be sent to state prison. 
1d. at 675, 631 P.2d at 34, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (emphasis in original). 
59. 1d. at 670, 631 P.2d at 31-32, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98. 
60. Joining the court's majority opinion were Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Richardson, 
and Stephens. The dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice Bird; Justices New-
man, and Woods concurring in the dissent. 
10
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withdrawal, citing Johnson as controlling. 
Calloway argued that Johnson was predicated upon section 
1192.5 which is applicable only when a defendant enters a plea 
of guilty or nolo contendere to an accusatory pleading charging a 
felony, thus not applicable to an admission of a probation viola-
tion. The court rejected this argument, noting that the underly-
ing principles of that section and Johnson apply, since it is no 
more appropriate for an appellate court to interfere with a trial 
court's discretion in this case when it would be in a case involv-
ing a guilty plea to a felony.81 Defendant further argued that his 
case presented the "very special circumstances" discussed in 
Kaanehe which entitled him to specific performance of the plea 
bargain, since he had already spent six months in prison in reli-
ance on the plea bargain. The court responded that Johnson 
spent far more than six months in prison and was not entitled to 
specific performance. The court also noted that "[i)n light of 
[Calloway's) inad~quate performance on probation, fairness de-
manded no more than he be permitted an opportunity to with-
draw his admission of probation violation and plead anew to the 
charge. "81 
The majority quickly disposed of People v. Flores where the 
defendant was allowed the benefit of his bargain, by noting that 
it preceded the Johnson and Kaanehe decisions, wherein the 
courts "expressed [their) reluctance to order specific perform-
ance of repudiated plea bargains. "8a 
Similarly, the court disposed of Santobello v. New York." 
In Santobello, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged 
that specific performance was a viable alternative to plea with-
drawal, but left the ultimate relief to the discretion of the state 
courts.eII 
Noting that Calloway would receive the appropriate credit 
for time already served, the court emphasized his poor perform-
ance on probation, the unanimous recommendation of the diag-
61. 29 Cal. 3d at 672,631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599. 
62.Id. 
63. Id. at 673, 731 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599. 
64. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
65. Id. at 262-63. 
11
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nostic staff favoring a prison sentence and the trial court's ac-
ceptance of that recommendation in holding that plea 
withdrawal is the most appropriate remedy.66 
• 
C. DISSENT 
While the majority opinion relied heavily on Johnson, the 
dissent found it distinguishable on several grounds. First, Callo-
way did not misrepresent himself to the court as did Johnson.6' 
When the court became aware of Johnson's misrepresentations, 
it withdrew its prior approval of the plea bargain. 
Second, Calloway, unlike Johnson, had agreed to submit to 
a section 1203.03 study in reliance on the court's promise, 
thereby giving up his freedom prior to sentencing. Since Callo-
way was at liberty on his own recognizance prior to the bargain, 
his submission to the section 1203.03 study involved a change in 
the status quo. This element of detrimental reliance is not nor-
mally present in plea bargains, which usually involve no change 
in custody status between entry of plea and actual sentencing 
and, consequently, plea withdrawal is inadequate to return the 
defendant to the status quo ante. 
Furthermore, Johnson did not argue that due process and 
fundamental fairness required specific enforcement; "[e]ven if 
he had, his own misrepresentations to the court to obtain the 
plea bargain undercut any equitable claim he might have had to 
the enforcement of the bargain. "6S Finally, the main issue in 
Johnson was whether defendant would be allowed to withdraw 
his plea, not whether he was entitled to specific enforcement." 
The dissent relied on Santobello'o in arguing that due pro-
66. 29 Cal. 3d at 673, 631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599. 
67. See People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d at 870·71,519 P.2d at 605, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 
557. 
68. 29 Cal. 3d at 678, 631 P.2d at 36, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 602. 
69. The specific performance issue was brought up at oral argument but was not 
briefed, which hampered the court's adjudication of possible remedies for broken plea 
bargains. Id. at n.2, 631 P.2d at 36 n.2, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 602 n.2. 
70. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). There has been some dispute over the Santobello decision. 
It is not clear whether the Court considered the choice of remedies in a broken plea 
bargain to be a matter of the state law or of constitutional grounds. See generally Wes-
ten & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. 
REV. 471 (1978); Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken 
12
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cess required specific performance. The Santobello court noted 
that due process considerations govern the remedy when a plea 
bargain is breached and the variations in plea bargain violations 
are such that no absolute rule can be formulated that will fit 
every case.?l 
People u. Kaanehe also illustrated the proposition that a 
remedy for a broken plea bargain depends on the case. As the 
court stated: "Specific performance of a plea bargain agreement 
is actually a broad term c'overing several different types of relief. 
The remedy differs depending upon the nature of the breach 
and the party which is seeking specific enforcement.'m 
IV. ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVES 
Many of the California cases dealing with the question of 
remedies available to a criminal defendant when the court 
breaks a plea bargained agreement mention specific enforcement 
as an alternative to plea withdrawal. Some courts recognize that 
for fairness reasons plea withdrawal is not always the most ap-
propriate.78 The issue the cases rarely address is when a defen-
dant is entitled to choose his remedy. The only guideline offered 
by the courts on this question is the "very special circum-
stances" criteria mentioned in Kaanehe.?4 Although the courts, 
so far, have declined to elaborate on what factors may constitute 
"very special circumstances," perhaps it is those factors which 
would deprive a defendant of his due proces rights if the defen-
dant is not afforded his choice of remedy for a broken plea bar-
gain. Because section 1192.5 allows plea withdrawal in the event 
of a broken plea agreement, the "very special circumstances" 
guideline will only apply in situations where a defendant seeks 
specific enforcement. 
Promises, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 792-94 (1973). 
71. See 404 U.S. 257, 262-63; id. at 267 (Douglas J. concurring); id. at 267-68 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring and dissenting). 
72. 19 Cal. 3d at 13, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417. 
73. See, e.g., James v. Smith, 445 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Carter, 
454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1973); People v. Eck, 39 Mich. 
App. 176, 197 N.W.2d 289 (1972). See also Fischer, Beyond Santobello-Remedies for 
Reneged Plea Bargains, 2 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 121 (1973). For a discussion of two differ-
ent theories upon which relief is granted to defendants whose bargains have been bro-
ken, see Comment, Remedies for Reneged Plea Bargains in California, 16 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 103 (1975). 
74. 19 Cal. 3d at 13, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417. 
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The degree to which a defendant's due process rights may 
be violated by the preclusion of specific enforcement as a rem-
edy for a broken plea agreement appears to depend, at present, 
on how one reads the Santobello decision. Because the Supreme 
Court remanded the case to the New York State courts to deter-
mine whether plea withdrawal or specific enforcement of the 
state's promise was the appropriate remedy, the Supreme Court 
avoided deciding which form of relief was constitutionally re-
quired. This could be interpreted as a recognition that the 
choice of remedies is entirely a matter of state law, since, in his 
opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger left the choice of 
remedy "to the discretion of the state court."'JII However, he also 
said that in exercising its discretion, the state court should de-
cide whether the circumstances of the case "requires" specific 
enforcement or recession,78 implying that the state court's dis-
cretion is subject to constitutional constraints and ultimate re-
view by the Supreme Court. Apparently, this was Justice Doug-
las' interpretation since he concurred in the decision, although 
he clearly considered the choice of remedies to be a matter of 
constitutional law." 
Regardless of whether a specific remedy is constitutionally 
required, there is another, albeit less compelling, reason for 
granting specific enforcement of a plea bargained agreement: In 
some circumstances, specific enforcement may be the only incen-
tive for a defendant to agree to enter the plea bargaining 
process. 
Plea bargaining is highly desirable to the criminal justice 
system because it benefits both the state and the defendant. As 
one court noted, "[t]he advantages to the state and society ... 
are that prompt punishment attains society's objectives of pun-
ishment more effectively than belated punishment; bargaining 
results in saving judicial and prosecutorial resources so that 
more time can be conserved for cases that involve substantive 
issues of a defendant's guilt; a defendant who pleads guilty is 
more remorseful and more likely to be 8uccesfully rehabili-
tated."" Furthermore, the defendant is able to enjoy the fruits 
75. 404 U.S. at 263. 
76.ld. 
77. ld. at 267. 
78. People v. Barnett, 113 Cal. App. 3d 563, 571,170 Cal. Rptr. 255, 259 (1980). See 
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of his negotiations and can avoid the uncertainties and possible 
embarrassment accompanying trial." 
For plea bargaining to function effectively, judges and pros-
ecutors should be mindful of the goals which the plea bargaining 
process attains and recognize that a defendant's willingness to 
waive his constitutional rights is the essential factor upon which 
the process hinges. The willingness of a defendant to enter into 
a plea agreement is largely dependent upon the capacity of the 
available remedy, in the event of breach, to return him to his 
original position. Where a defendant offers only to plead guilty 
in exchange for a lighter sentence or a lesser charge, plea with-
drawal will return the defendant to the original status quo. 
However, in other plea bargained agreements this is not always 
possible. In some instances, the defendant may provide the pros-
ecution with assistance'O or information81 involving significant 
risks and inconvenience, or as in Calloway, a changed position in 
reliance on the bargain, so that the pre-plea bargained status 
quo cannot be restored by plea withdrawal. 
In cases where plea withdrawal does not restore the defen-
dant to his original position, the court is depriving defendant of 
most, if not all, the benefits which the defendant seeks in enter-
ing plea bargaining negotiations. It is in these situations that the 
appellate courts need guidelines to aid them is determining just 
how far a trial judge can go in rejecting a plea bargain after re-
ceiving the benefits of it. The Calloway case would have been an 
appropriate vehicle for an elaboration of the "very special cir-
cumstances" guideline set forth in Kaanehe. The determination 
is best done on a case-by-case basis because of the numerous 
also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1977). 
79. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 571, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 259. When the original charge carries 
repugnant stigma, such as a sex crime, the defendant may avoid publicity, by. pleading to 
a less repugnant offense. E.g., State v. Ashby, 43 N.J. 273, 204 A.2d 1 (1964) (defendant 
pleaded guilty to five indictments for disorderly conduct in return for dismissal of five 
indictments for open lewdness). 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969) (identification 
of forged bonds); People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal. 2d 110, 403 P.2d 429, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173 
(1965) (defendant's risky acquisition of weapons used in robbery); Commonwealth v. 
Todd, 186 Pa. Super. 272, 142 A.2d 174(1958) (defendant assisted in apprehension and 
conviction of narcotics violators by testifying before ground jury and trial court). 
81. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 
U.S. 933 (1973); Ward v. United States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); United States v. 
Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969). 
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forms plea bargains can take and the many situations to which 
they may lead. 
It is urged by the dissent in Calloway and endorsed by this 
author that the "competing interests of the defendant and the 
state should be weighted in deciding the appropriate remedy for 
a broken plea bargain."as Factors favoring the prosecution's or 
court's choice of remedy are: (1) fraud by the defendant in ob-
taining the plea bargain; (2) additional damaging information 
about the defendant that is later developed; and (3) changed cir-
cumstances occurring between entry of plea and time of sentenc-
ing which place the defendant in a less favorable light. Factors 
favoring the defendant's choice of remedy are: (1) full perform-
ance by defendant of his part of the bargain, especially if he has 
begun a term of imprisonment; and (2) a willful and deliberate 
breach of a plea bargain by a prosecutor or the court.aa 
The majority in Calloway relied on basically three factors in 
determining that plea withdrawal was the appropriate remedy. 
First, the court is reluctant to interfere with the broad discretion 
afforded the trial judge by section 1192.5 to withdraw his ap-
proval of a negotiated plea.84 While this factor is important, it is 
present in every case where'a plea bargain is breached and, in a 
sense, creates a presumption favoring the trial court's disposi-
tion of the case. Other than this presumption, however, the trial 
court's discretion should carry no weight. 
Second, the majority noted: "In light of defendant's inade-
quate performance on probation, fairness demands no more than 
that he be permitted an opportunity to withdraw his admission 
of probation violation and plead anew to that charge.''B1l 
Third, the court appeared impressed with the unanimous 
recommendation of the diagnostic staff favoring imposition of a 
prison sentence. a8 
As to the second and third factors, although Calloway's pa-
82. 29 Cal. 3d at 678·79 n.3, 631 P.2d at 37 n.3, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 603 n.3. 
83.Id. 
84. Id. at 673, 631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599. 
85. Id. at 672,631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599. 
86. Id. at 673, 631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599. 
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role performance was grossly inadequate, the probation reports 
were before the trial court at the time the bargain was struck,8? 
and, as such, do not constitute additional information later de-
veloped as in the Johnson case.88 
V. CONCLUSION 
California courts have not readily agreed with criminal de-
fendants' contentions that they should be allowed the option of 
specific enforcement of a plea bargained agreement when broken 
by the court. While recognizing the possible availability of spe-
cific enforcement in this context under "very special circum-
stances,"89 the courts do not attempt to explain what type of 
circumstances may lead to this remedy. The factors present in 
Calloway seem to be a persuasive case for this type of remedy. 
Admittedly, the courts are constrained by the legislative 
remedies imposed by Penal Code section 1192.5, which does not 
mention specific enforcement as an alternative remedy. Yet 
there must be a limit to the lengths a court will go in assuming 
that plea withdrawal will, in all cases, restore the status quo. At 
some point, due process may require specific enforcement of a 
broken plea bargain. eo Until that time arrives, the structure of 
the plea bargaining system should not be undermined by preclu-
sion of the specific enforcement remedy when fairness requires 
it. 
For defendants to be willing to enter into the process, they 
need some guarantee that their plea bargains will be honored or, 
at least, that they can return unharmed to their pre-plea bar-
gained positions. Even in cases where the status quo can be re-
stored by plea withdrawal, a defendant must start again at 
square one of the judicial process after, in many cases, consider-
able time and money are spent in an attempt to plea bargain. In 
the long run, this tends to frustrate one of the main purposes for 
87. Jd. at 676, 631 P.2d at 35, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 601. 
88. 10 Cal. 3d at 870, 519 P.2d at 605, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 557. 
89. People v. Kaanehe, 19 Cal. 3d at 13, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417. 
90. People v. Calloway, 29 Cal. 3d at 680,631 P.2d at 38,175 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (Bird, 
C. J., dissenting); See generally, Westen & Westin, supra note 70. 
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which the plea bargaining process was created-to decrease the 
already overcrowded court dockets. 
Lawrence E. Butler 
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